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COMMENTAIRES 
FINAL POSITION ARBITRATION AND INTERTEMPORAL 
COMPROMISE : THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA 
COMPROMISE 
Gène SWIMMER 
Fixed position or final offer arbitration has been a subject of con-
troversy, since Stevens 1 originalry proposed this new mode of dispute 
seulement. Under this System, an arbitrator must pick the final offer of 
either management or the union, without a compromise. The logic for 
adopting final offer arbitration can be summarized as follows. When a 
contract dispute goes to compulsory arbitration2, the temptation for the 
arbitrator to compromise is great. He appears « fair > by giving some 
concessions to both sides and does not alienate either of the parties, avoid-
ing the possibility that he won't be called in as an arbitrator at some later 
date. Because both the union and management are aware of the tendency 
to compromise, neither side will likely make real concessions during the 
negotiations. In other words, if arbitrators « split the différence », the 
more outrageous your side's final position the more likely you will get a 
better seulement. 
Final offer arbitration attempts to neutralize this kind of negotiating 
strategy. Without the possibility of compromise, it is presumed that 
neither side will take extrême positions because they want their side to 
be selected. Unlike regular arbitration which leads to érosion of col-
lective bargaining, the risk of final offer arbitration should encourage 
both sides to bargain in good faith, in order to avoid the final step. 
* G. Swimmer, Assistant Prof essor, School of Public Administration Carleton 
University. 
** The author would like to thank Rolf Mirus of the University of Alberta 
for his essential assistance. Ail views expressed are solidy those of the author. 
1
 Cari STEVENS, « Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible with Bargaining ? » 
Industrîal Relations, Vol. 5, No. 2, Febmary 1966, pp. 38-52. For additional articles 
dealing with the theoretical and empirical benefits of fixed position arbitration see 
Joseph GRODIN, « Either or Arbitration for Public Employée Disputes », Indus-
trial Relations, Vol. 11, No. 2, May 1972, pp. 260-266, and Gary LONG, and Peter 
FEUILLE, « Final Offer Arbitration : 'Sudden Death' in Eugène », Industrîal and 
Labor Relations Review, Vol. 27, No. 2, January 1974, pp. 186-203. 
2
 This is most likely to occur in public employment or essential services ne-
gotiations where the right to strike has been eliminated by consent or by législation. 
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We believe, however, that in many situations final offer arbitration 
merely substitutes an intertemporal compromise for a static (one period) 
compromise. If the final step in the procédure is reached in one wage 
round, there is a strong probability that negotiations will go to the final 
step in subséquent wage rounds, with the arbitrator's sélection flipping 
from one side to the other between wage rounds. The benefits of final-offer 
arbitration may be illusory. 
In order to illustrate the problem associated with final offer arbi-
tration, we will discuss the expérience of the University of Alberta Aca-
démie Staff negotiations. Since 1971 the Association of Académie Staff 
of the University of Alberta (AASUA) and the Board of Governors of 
the University hâve agreed to submit ail unsettled issues to final offer 
arbitration (actually called final offer sélection) 3. During the four wage 
rounds, since the institution of the procédure, the only issue to be nego-
tiated was the size of the cost of living or se aie adjustment. 4 The Board 
of Governors has generally taken the view that how the percentage in-
crease was distributed between wages and fringe benefits was up to the 
association. In the first year of opération, the AASUA and the Board of 
Governors agreed on a 4.5% scale increase, subject to the provincial 
grant to the university being no more or less than 2% away from a joint-
ly agreed upon projection. In fact, the Alberta grant fell more than 2% 
short so that the previous agreement was nullified, and negotiations re-
sumed. Actually the AASUA could do little but demand that the 4.5% 
be retained. Their constituency would not look kindly on a voluntary de-
crease in the scale adjustment to a level below the cost of living increase 
for the previous year. The Board of Governors demanded a réduction to 
a 3.14% increase, in Une with its fiscal crisis. No agreement could be 
reached, a sélection officer was appointed and he eventually selected the 
Board of Governors final offer of 3.14%. 
Notice that the first resort to final offer arbitration was caused by 
a random phenomenon, an unexpected décline of the provincial grant to 
the university. Having reached the final sélection step once, both parties 
were thrown into a situation where arbitration would be resorted to in 
the next two rounds with this round's loser (AASUA) being next round's 
winner and so on, until another random event broke the cycle. The rea-
3
 For a detailed description of the Alberta process, see John CHUNG, « Col-
lective Bargaining on University Campuses : The Expérience of the University of 
Alberta», paper for the Fédération des Associations de Professeurs d'Université du 
Québec, January, 1972. In this article, Chung expresses concern as to the legality 
of the sélection officer's award. In practice this has not been a problem. The Board 
of Governors, the Province, and the Académie Staff Association hâve honoured 
every award handed down by the sélection officers. 
4
 The one exception was an issue dealing with the structure of merit incré-
ments for full professors. This issue was settled without resort to arbitration, during 
the 1973 negotiations. 
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sons were simple : inflation and the fiscal problems of the university did 
not go away, and neither did the désire of arbitrators to compromise. 
In the 1972 negotiations, the Association demanded a scale in-
crease of 5.3% which was equal to the cost of living increase while the 
Board of Governors would not offer anymore than 4 % . The AASUA 
was unwilling to settle for that figure because they felt they had been given 
too low an increase the year before and were therefore, entitled at least 
to the cost of living. Going to final offer sélection fit in perfectly with the 
Association's goals. They could argue to the arbitrator that their salaries 
were below many other universities and secondly that the university could 
afford the seulement because it had gotten off easily last year.5 It appears 
that thèse arguments made sensé to the arbitrator, because he sided with 
the staff for a 5.3% increase. 
Looking at the situation hypothetically from the arbitrator's view-
point, siding with the AASUA was much less risky than siding with the 
Board of Governors. His sélection would be less likely to alienate the 
Board of Governors, because he had « compromised » between the award 
of last year's sélection officer and his own. If he sided against the staff, 
making them « losers » two years in a row, we believe he would not 
hâve been considered again as an acceptable sélection officer by the 
AASUA. Thus, the temptation to compromise, albeit between wage 
rounds, still exists with final offer arbitration. 
In 1973, the situation was exactly reversed. The Staff Association 
demanded a scale adjustment equal to the cost of living. The Board of 
Governors agreed on the merits of the AASUA case, but was totally un-
able to increase salaries by that figure, because of a small increase in 
the provincial grant to the university and secondly because the cost of 
last years seulement had necessitated budget tightening even before the 
bad news from the Province. Again the Staff Association did not want 
to go on record as offering to take a eut in real wages, and facing a « ma-
nagement » who thought it could win at the final offer sélection, resort 
to arbitration was inévitable. The Board of Governors, in their présen-
tation before the sélection officer, stated that while the académie staff 
was entitled to a scale adjustment commensurate with the cost of living 
increase, the university was unable to pay anymore than 5.0%. Whilè 
one never knows for sure, the fact that the staff had received a reason-
able increase in the preceeding year likely made the sélection of the 
Board of Governor's final offer more palatable for the arbitrator. His 
sélection is certainly consistent with a désire not to alienate via inter-
temporal compromise. 
Strangely, in May the Administration found itself with a surplus of 
one million dollars (despite its pleas of poverty), due mainly to excep-
5 Informai discussions with members of the association's bargaining team 
suggests that thèse arguments were in fact used. 
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tional performance of the university investment portfolio. The Board 
of Governors, having gone on record as believing that both académie 
(and non-academic) staff wage increases should be commensurate with 
CPI increases, decided to distribute the surplus to the staff. For académie 
staff, this meant an additional scale increase of 2.5% to a total of 7.5% 
which was roughly équivalent to the AASUA final offer. Thus a second 
random occurrance broke the chain. Despite losing in arbitration, the 
Association could not be considered a loser, and neither could the Board 
of Governors. Neither side could complain to the arbitrator in 1974 
about their unfortunate plight as a resuit of the 1973 award, and there-
fore, there would be no way for an arbitrator to make an intertemporal 
compromise. With both the AASUA and the Board of Governors aware 
of this situation, it is not surprising that in the 1974 wage round the 
parties settled on the scale adjustment without resorting to the final step. 
We believe that the Alberta expérience is consistent with our basic 
premise that final offer arbitration substitutes intertemporal compromise 
for static compromise. 6 Indeed the underlying problem of the Alberta 
case has been prévalent for many North American jurisdiction in the 
1970's. Inflation has been eroding wages of public service workers and 
their respective managements' budgets. We believe substituting final 
offer arbitration for regular arbitration in any of thèse jurisdictions would 
not increase the likelihood of real collective bargaining between manage-
ment and union. Indeed, without a possibility of static compromise the 
likelihood of going to the final step might be higher than under regular 
arbitration. 
6
 An obvious question is how likely is it that the flip-flopping of awards could 
hâve occurred by chance. In particular, given that managements offer was selected 
in 1971, what is the probability that the union side would be selected in 1972 and 
managements side would be selected in 1973. If fixed position arbitration has no 
impact on bargaining, then let's assume that the probability of going to arbitration 
in any year is .5 and the probability of either side being selected by an arbitrator 
in any year is also .5. The probability of the union being selected by an Arbitrator 
in 1972 and management being selected in 1973 therefore equals : 
PR (Arbitration)
 1972 X PR (Union sélection) 1972 X PR (Arbitration) 1973 
X PR (MGMT sélection)
 1973 = (.5) 4 = .0625 
In other words this outeome would occur by chance only 6.25% of the time. If 
one assumes that the probability of going to arbitration in any given year is .8, 
then the flip-flop of awards would hâve occurred by chance 16% of the time. 
